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A CONSTANT BATTLE: THE EVOLVING
CHALLENGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL
FIGHT AGAINST DOPING IN SPORT
JESSICA K. FOSCHI*
The practice of sport is a human right. Every individual must have
the possibility of practicing sport, without discrimination of any kind
and in the Olympic spirit, which requires mutual understanding with
1
a spirit of friendship, solidarity, and fair play.
2

Doping is fundamentally contrary to the spirit of sport.

INTRODUCTION
Sport provides many benefits to the world community that
should be lauded and commended. Every day, all over the world, the
competitive spirit of sport leads individuals of all varieties to the
playing fields and sporting arenas of their communities. Athletics
promote health, leadership, commitment, fair play, and general
interaction among human beings across the globe. From the local
little league baseball diamond to the iconic stadiums of the Olympic
Games, sport touches individuals in every country and from every
walk of life. However, the same passions, which inspire the positive
elements of sport can lead to negative consequences. The most
blatant and widespread example of this passion gone awry is the
rampant use of banned substances by athletes at all levels of sport to
gain an unfair competitive advantage.
Doping in sports has become the biggest challenge facing the
positive goals of the Olympic Movement. Nothing undermines the
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1. Int’l Olympic Comm. [IOC], Olympic Charter (2004), at 9, available at
http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_122.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
2. World Anti-Doping Agency [WADA], World Anti-Doping Code [hereinafter the
Code], at 3, available at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/code_v3.pdf (last visited
Apr. 2, 2006).
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principles of “fair play” more than athletes giving themselves an
unfair artificial advantage while others rely on their natural potential.
In 1999, the world of sport took a meaningful step to address this
problem, with the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency
3
(WADA) and the promulgation of the World Anti-Doping Code
(“the Code”).4 The major achievements of WADA have been its
ability to unify the fight against doping and provide a uniform code of
5
doping standards. However, the first six years of WADA’s existence
reveal that problem areas remain.
Accordingly, this Note will discuss problems of unregulated
nutritional supplements and shortcomings in the international effort
to keep up with designer drugs and new doping methods—persistent
obstacles to WADA’s efforts. Additionally, the strict liability
6
standard adopted by WADA effectively shifts the burden of these
obstacles onto the athletes. Until the gap can be closed in the areas
of regulation and testing, WADA must do more to shoulder this
burden. Otherwise, the prevalence of false positive tests7 will
continue, risking the careers and reputations of innocent athletes.
Part I of this Note will provide a brief discussion of doping
regulations prior to the 1999 formation of WADA. Part II will
highlight some of the changes that WADA has made to the fight
against doping. Part III will detail the recent case of Kicker Vencill,
an American swimmer who tested positive for a steroid precursor in
2003. Part IV will use the Vencill case to discuss the inadequacies of
current testing. Part V will provide a discussion of WADA’s strict
liability standard in light of the Vencill case. Finally, Part VI will
present suggestions for improvement to the system. While doping is

3. WADA, Mission,
http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=255 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006)
(“The World Anti-Doping Agency was created to promote, coordinate, and monitor at the
international level the fight against doping in sport in all its forms.”).
4. WADA, What Is the Code, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?page
Category.id=364 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) (“The Code is the core document that provides the
framework for anti-doping policies, rules, and regulations within sport organizations and among
public authorities.”).
5. Infra discussion Section III.
6. The strict liability standard is embodied implicitly in Article 2. and explicitly in the
Comment to Article 2.1.1. The Code, supra note 2, at 8.
7. The Note uses the term “false positive test” to describe the situation where a positive
test result is caused by an outside source (not the athlete) such as the inadvertent ingestion of a
banned substance, or sabotage (among other possibilities). This situation involves no intention
on the part of the athlete to cheat or gain an unfair competitive advantage.
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clearly an international problem, this Note will use examples and
events from the United States.
I. THE PRE-WADA REGIME
Prior to WADA’s formation in November of 1999, a complex
system of organizations governed doping in sports. This pre-WADA
system was seen as complicated, archaic, and unfair. Michael
Straubel has even referred to it as “the Byzantine and dysfunctional
world of anti-doping control.”8 He further described this system from
the athletes’ perspective as one that “ignore[d] basic notions of due
process by incorrectly assigning burdens, issue[d] punishment before
holding a hearing and use[d] biased arbitrators.”9 Even athletes that
were routinely tested seldom knew about or understood the drug
testing rules.10 In order to understand the pre-WADA system, a brief
review of the structure of international sports governance is
necessary.
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) heads the Olympic
11
Movement, and its authority includes doping regulation. In order
for a sport to be included in the Olympics, the sport must have an
IOC-recognized International Federation (IF).12 An IF is charged
with creating the rules for the sport it governs, organizing and holding
competitions in the sport other than the Olympics, and establishing
criteria for the selection of Olympic teams.13 Below the IFs are the
14
National Governing Bodies (NGB) of each sport in each country.
NGBs act similarly to IFs, yet they govern nationally rather than
internationally. Each country that participates in the Olympics also
has a National Olympic Committee (NOC) charged with overseeing
8. Michael S. Straubel, Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control Process in
International Sport, 106 DICK. L. REV. 523, 531 (2002).
9. Id.
10. See Jill Pilgrim & Kim Betz, A Journey Through Olympic Drug Testing Rules: A
Practitioner’s Guide to Understanding Drug Testing Within the Olympic Movement, 2 VAND. J.
ENT. L. & PRAC. 210, 211 (2000).
11. Straubel, supra note 8, at 532 (“[T]he Olympic Movement is still the blueprint that
governs the distribution of control and power in international sports. International legitimacy
begins with and flows from the Olympic Games including doping control.”).
12. Id. Some examples of IFs are the International Association of Athletics Federations
(IAAF) for track and field, the Federation Internationale de Football (FIFA) for soccer, and
the Federation Internationale de Natation (FINA) for aquatic sports.
13. Id.
14. Id. For example, in the United States, U.S. Track & Field (U.S. T&F) is the NGB
under the IAAF for track and field; US Soccer is the NGB under FIFA; and USA Swimming is
the NGB for swimming under FINA.
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the county’s Olympic entries.15 Whether a NOC has authority over
the NGBs only in Olympic years, or in both Olympic and non16
Olympic years depends upon the country.
Before the creation of WADA, the IOC set the testing
procedures and the list of prohibited substances for the Olympic
17
However, outside of the Olympic Games, each IF
Games.
controlled its own testing procedures, created its own prohibited
18
substance list, and regulated the timing and frequency of testing.
The NGBs and NOCs were then in charge of enforcing the rules
19
established by their IF and the IOC.
The first problem this type of system created was inconsistency—
20
between sports, between the IOC and IFs, and between IFs and
21
NGBs (which were influenced by the domestic laws of their
country). These inconsistencies were compounded by the conflicts of
22
interest, which arose from an NGB’s prosecution of its own athletes.
The NGBs had a strong incentive to favor its own athletes in its
proceedings.23
Furthermore, cases could often be appealed (depending on the
IF’s rules) to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS),24 a tribunal
created by the IOC to “bring order to the chaotic and inconsistent

15. Straubel, supra note 8, at 532.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 533.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., id. at 539 (“[T]he IAAF rules place the burden of proof on the IAAF to prove
that a doping offense occurred. In contrast, FINA places the burden of challenging the testing
procedures on the athlete.”).
21. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 841 F. Supp. 1444, 1448 (S.D. Ohio
1992) (IAAF overturned the decision of The Athletic Congress (later U.S. T&F)); Foschi v.
Federation Internationale de Natation Amateure, CAS 1996/156 (Ct. Arb. Sport 1996) (FINA
overturned the decision of the U.S. Swimming Board of Directors and American Arbitration
Association panel); Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 587 (7th Cir. 2001)
(IAAF overturned decision of U.S. T&F and found that Slaney had committed a doping
violation).
22. See, e.g., Travis T. Tygart, Winners Never Dope and Finally, Dopers Never Win:
USADA Takes Over Drug Testing of United States Olympic Athletes, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 124, 126-27 (2003) (noting that the precursor to USADA, NADP, was
criticized for having financial and other interests in having the best US athletes compete, and
therefore had little incentive to find that they had committed a doping violation).
23. Id. at 127.
24. Straubel, supra note 8, at 539.
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world of international sports adjudications.”25 The CAS has, in effect,
developed its own body of case law by applying “general principles of
law and concepts of natural justice” rather than the law of any
particular country.26 The CAS also usually hears cases de novo, and,
27
therefore, does not necessarily have to rely on the findings of the IF.
While the CAS was helpful to some degree because of its
independence, it could not always make up for the confusion resulting
28
from the inconsistencies among the IOC, IFs, NGBs, and NOCs.
II. WADA: ON THE RIGHT TRACK
Though the international community was aware of the system’s
problems, the proverbial “straw that broke the camel’s back” was the
29
1998 Tour de France doping scandal. After French police found
large quantities of prohibited substances in a car belonging to Festina,
a French cycling team, the police began raiding many of the other
teams on the tour.30 These raids led to drop-outs by several teams and
individuals and the discovery of more banned substances.31 The 1998
Tour scandal was a reflection of the worldwide doping problem
exhibited through a popular international sport and provided the
catalyst for a larger, more comprehensive effort to fight doping.32 As
a result of the Tour scandal, the IOC organized the World
Conference on Doping in Sport in Lausanne, Switzerland, in

25. Michael Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of
Arbitration for Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1207 (2005).
26. Straubel, supra note 8, at 542.
27. Id. at 543.
28. James A.R. Nafziger, Dispute Resolution in the Arena of International Sports
Competition, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 161, 179 (2002) (“The [CAS] likely will play an increasingly
important role in itself and in establishing appropriate relationships among sanction-applying
and sanction-reviewing institutions. Quite likely, however, the institutional structure for
resolving disputes will remain complex.”).
29. WADA, A Brief History of Anti-Doping, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?
pageCategory.id=253 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) [hereinafter History of Anti-Doping].
30. Tour Tarnished by Drugs Scandal, BBC NEWS, Aug. 3, 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
special_report/1998/07/98/tour_de_france/144326.stm.
31. Id.
32. But see Straubel, supra note 8, at 555 (“[W]hile uniformity and efficiency may be the
stated purpose of the Anti-Doping Code, the unstated purpose may very well be to improve
public relations. Recent doping scandals threaten the future of the Olympic Movement . . . .
Such an image will seriously curtail sponsorship and money to the Olympic Movement. Shortly
after the Tour de France scandal, many sponsors threatened to withdraw support. Even though
the IOC benefits from the public attention created by drug produced world records, it would
suffer from the mass exodus of sponsors and viewers.”).
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February 1999.33 This conference sought to create “an independent
international agency, which would set unified standards for antidoping work and coordinate the efforts of sports organizations and
public authorities.”34 The resulting organization, WADA, officially
35
came into being on November 10, 1999.
WADA implements and oversees the World Anti-Doping
Program (“the Program”), which consists of the Code, International
Standards (including the Prohibited List, Testing Standards,
Laboratory Standards, Standards for Therapeutic Use Exemptions),
36
and Models of Best Practice. The dual purposes of the Program and
the Code are, first, “[t]o protect the Athlete’s fundamental right to
participate in doping-free sport and thus promote health, fairness,
and equality for Athletes worldwide;” and, second, “[t]o ensure
harmonized, coordinated and effective anti-doping programs at the
international level with regard to detection, deterrence and
prevention of doping.”37 Both the Code and the International
Standards are mandatory upon an IF’s acceptance of the Code, while
the Models of Best Practice are recommended, but not mandatory.38
Since WADA’s formation, virtually every sporting organization in the
39
Therefore, WADA has achieved
world has accepted the Code.
major success in at least one of its goals, the harmonization of antidoping programs.
WADA has also lessened the conflicts of interest, which were a
major problem before its inception. Most countries now have a
National Anti-Doping Organization (NADO), which oversees the
40
WADA-type responsibilities for that country. A NADO has the
“primary authority and responsibility to adopt and implement antidoping rules, direct the collection of samples, the management of test
results, and the conduct of hearings all at the national level.”41 Before
WADA, an athlete contesting a positive test result would go through

33. History of Anti-Doping, supra note 29.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The Code, supra note 2, at 3.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1.
39. WADA,
Code,
Acceptance,
http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?page
Category.id=270 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). Note that no American professional sports have
accepted the Code as of the date of this publication.
40. The Code, supra note 2, at 75.
41. Id.
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the procedures set out by their NGB.42 Now, the athlete goes through
the NADO. NADOs are usually independent of the NGBs and
NOCs, which helps eliminate the conflicts of interest stemming from
organizations prosecuting and adjudicating the doping violations of
their own athletes. Additionally, the NADO applies the rules of the
IF of the athlete’s sport. Since all IFs must adopt anti-doping rules,
which conform with the Code,43 the NADO effectively applies one
system of rules to all athletes. Similarly, on the international level,
CAS (rather than the IFs) is responsible for hearing all appeals from
NADOs.44
WADA is meant to be a complete umbrella organization,
governing even professional sports.45 It is, therefore, a goal of
WADA to encourage professional sports organizations to sign onto
the Code.46 The success of this goal has been mixed. For example,
when the IOC first asked each IF to accept its new Anti-Doping
Code, FIFA “balked at some of the provisions in the Code and felt
that it had the independence to go its own way.”47 Indeed,
professional sports, which have large amounts of resources and loyal
fan bases do not necessarily need the Olympics in order to maintain
their popularity.48 Despite this fact, WADA and FIFA completed a
November 2001 agreement allowing FIFA to “conduct an
independent drug-testing regime and establish its own sanction

42. See Straubel, supra note 8, at 534 (using the example of Butch Reynold’s case to
demonstrate what an athlete had to do to contest a positive test result under the pre-WADA
system).
43. The Code, supra note 2, art. 20.3.1, at 55.
44. Id. art. 13.2.1, at 38.
45. The Code, supra note 2, at 1 (“The Code is the fundamental and universal document
upon which the World Anti-Doping Program in sport is based.”) (emphasis added).
46. WADA, Q&A on the Code, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?page
Category.id=367 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) (“WADA has contacted many of these leagues and,
with the support of governments and other sports organizations, hopes that all of them will
accept and implement the Code in order to have one single standard for all athletes in all sports
and in all countries.”).
47. Straubel, supra note 8, at 533.
48. See Sarah Baldwin, Note, Performance Enhancing Drug Use in Olympic Sports: A
Comparison of the United States and Australian Approaches, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 265, 273 (2002) (noting that the IOC has to fight to keep soccer in the Olympic games
because “FIFA is not dependent upon the IOC for its funding or existence”).

05__FOSCHI.DOC

464

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

8/1/2006 3:05 PM

[Vol 16:457

schedule.”49 However, while FIFA has adopted the Code, it usually
50
only sends developing players to compete in the Olympics.
In a separate effort, the Olympic charter has been amended to
mandate the adoption of the Code in order for a sport to be included
51
in the Olympic Games. However, professional sports organizations
(such as the NBA and NFL) that have yet to adopt the Code can still
send players to events under the jurisdiction of organizations that
have adopted it as long as the players comply with the Code at the
particular event.52 Although this is not exactly the “mandatory”
compliance that the Code calls for, “it suggests that WADA’s
potential to transcend Olympic sport and influence professional
athletics is very real.”53
While there is no doubt that WADA has unified the anti-doping
infrastructure and has provided an independent54 body to oversee the
adjudication of doping cases, there are still many areas that require
revision and improvement. As mentioned earlier, WADA has been
very successful in fulfilling one of its stated purposes, harmonization.
However, it has been far less successful in the pursuit of its other
stated purpose, protection of the athlete. The remainder of this Note
will analyze WADA’s current efforts to fulfill this latter purpose and
provide suggestions for greater success. The following case highlights
some of the imperfections remaining in the WADA Code.

49. Edward H. Jurith & Mark W. Beddoes, The United States’ and International Response
to the Problem of Doping in Sports, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 461, 483-84
(2002).
50. Baldwin, supra note 48, at 273.
51. WADA,
Q&A
on
the
Code,
http://www.wadaama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=367 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
52. Id.
53. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 49, at 483-84.
54. While WADA is clearly independent of IFs and NGBs, its independence is undermined
by its strong ties to the IOC, which paid twenty-five million dollars for its establishment and
covers fifty percent of its annual budget. See IOC, Protection of Athletes: Activities of the
International
Olympic
Committee,
http://www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/missions/athletesuk.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
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III. VENCILL V. USADA55
To begin the discussion of the inadequacies of the current antidoping system, it is helpful to examine a recent real-world example.
On January 21, 2003, a twenty-five-year-old American swimmer
named Kicker Vencill tested positive for 19-norandrosterone (a
byproduct of nandrolone and a steroid precursor) in a routine out-ofcompetition drug test.56 The test, administered by the United States
Anti-Doping Agency (the NADO for the United States, hereinafter
USADA) and performed by the accredited UCLA laboratory,
showed Vencill’s urine sample contained 4.3 ng/ml of 19norandrosterone,57 just above the 2 ng/ml level which triggers a
58
positive test. USADA recommended a four-year suspension from
the date of the test and a six-month retroactive cancellation of all
competitive results from that date.59 Vencill elected to contest the
proposed sanctions and exercised his right to a hearing before a panel
60
The AAA
of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).
hearing was held on June 21 and 22, 2003, and on July 24, an arbitral
decision suspended Vencill for four years but did not require any
retroactive cancellation of competitive results.61 Due to Vencill’s
suspension, he was removed from the United States’ roster for the
62
2003 Pan American games, and he missed the 2004 Olympic Trials.
Maintaining his innocence, Vencill had all the nutritional
supplements he was taking tested for banned substances, even though
55. This case is used in this Note to highlight the problem of inadvertent ingestion of
banned substances through the taking of contaminated nutritional supplements; the Note does
not purport to validate or invalidate Mr. Vencill’s claims of innocence. The Note does,
however, mean to purport that Mr. Vencill’s situation is representative of other cases like it.
See, e.g., Hans Knauss v. Int’l Ski Fed’n, CAS 2005/A/847 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2005) (finding that an
Austrian skier who took a contaminated nutritional supplement, which led to his positive drug
test should have his sanction reduced from two years to eighteen months because he barely fit
under the no significant fault or negligence standard because he had inquired about the product
directly to the distributor and personally knew and trusted a supplier of the supplement in
Austria).
56. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Vencill, AAA No. 30 190 00291 03, 3-4 (American
Arbitration Association, 2003) [hereinafter Vencill AAA Decision].
57. Id. at 7 (noting a study which found a grey zone between 2 ng/ml and 5 ng/ml, due to
the possibility of endogenous production).
58. Id. at 13
59. Id. at 4.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 22 n.26.
62. Kicker Vencill, 20 Question Tuesday Archive, USA SWIMMING, May 17, 2005,
http://www.usaswimming.org/USASWeb/ViewMiscArticle.aspx?TabId=280&Alias=Rainbow&
Lang=en&mid=408&ItemId=1706 [hereinafter Kicker Vencill].
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none of them, according to their labels, contained any banned
63
The results from the private lab showed that a
substances.
multivitamin that Vencill had been taking—Super Complete
manufactured by Ultimate Nutrition—was tainted with three
64
different steroid precursors. Vencill took this new information to his
appeal from AAA to the CAS hearing, held on November 10, 2003.
On July 11, 2003, subsequent to Vencill’s AAA hearing but prior
to his appeal to CAS, the Federation Internationale du Natation
[FINA], the international federation for swimming, adopted
65
WADA’s Code. Under the Code, when an international federation
or other “Anti-Doping Organization” adopts the code, Articles 1, 2,
3, 10, 11, 13 (with exception of one provision), “must be incorporated
essentially verbatim by each Anti-Doping Organization in its own
anti-doping rules.”66 These new rules adopted under the Code went
into effect, as far as FINA was concerned, on September 11, 2003.67
This being the case, FINA’s original requirement of a four-year ban
for a first offense was reduced to a two-year ban under the new
Article 10.2.68
Article 10.2, however, was not the only rule change that was
considered in the CAS decision. In light of Vencill’s private testing of
his multivitamin, he argued that, under newly adopted Article 10.5.1
(“No Fault or Negligence”)69 or, in the alternative, 10.5.2 (“No
Significant Fault or Negligence”),70 his sanction should be eliminated
71
The CAS panel cursorily dismissed Vencill’s 10.5.1
or reduced.
72
claim, pointing to the 10.5.2 comment, which gives the following
example of when the “no fault or negligence” standard would not
apply: “a positive test resulting from a mislabeled or contaminated
vitamin or nutritional supplement.”73 The panel also rejected
Vencill’s argument that he should get a reduced sanction under
10.5.2, but it provided a more thorough analysis for their 10.5.2
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Vencill v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, CAS 2004/A/484, at 11 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2004)
[hereinafter Vencill CAS Decision].
66. The Code, supra note 2, at 7.
67. Vencill CAS Decision, CAS 2004/A/484, at 11 n.12.
68. The Code, supra note 2, art. 10.2, at 26.
69. Id. art. 10.5.1.
70. Id. art. 10.5.2.
71. Vencill CAS Decision, CAS 2004/A/484, at 19.
72. Id. at 20-21.
73. The Code, supra note 2, art. 10.5.2 comment, at 30.
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holding.74 First, the panel qualified its comments by finding that
Vencill’s multivitamin was contaminated, that Vencill did not know of
the contamination, that he was taking this multivitamin at the time of
his January 2003 test, and that the contamination is what led to the
75
positive test. Despite these findings, the panel reprimanded Vencill
for not living up to the Article 2.1.1 standard, which reads:
It is each Athlete’s personal duty to ensure that no Prohibited
Substances enters his or her body. Athletes are responsible for any
Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers found to be
present in their bodily Specimens. Accordingly, it is not necessary
that intent, fault, negligence or knowing Use on the Athlete’s part
be demonstrated in order to establish an anti-doping violation
76
under Article 2.1.

In concluding that he did not live up to this standard, the panel said
that his conduct—including ignoring the many warnings he received
from USADA regarding the risk involved in taking nutritional
supplements, and also taking a variety of supplements recommended
to him by teammates without consulting a parent, coach, or doctor,
and without getting them tested—”amount[ed] to a total disregard of
his positive duty,” and that his “‘fault or negligence’ in the
circumstances [was] exceptionally ‘significant.’”77 Finally, the panel
said of Vencill:
We hold that for an athlete in this day and age to rely—as this
athlete claims he did—on the advice of friends and on product
labels when deciding to use supplements and vitamins, is
tantamount to a type of willful blindness for which he must be held
responsible. This “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil” attitude
in the face of what rightly has been called the scourge of doping in
sport—this failure to exercise the slightest caution in the
circumstances—is not only unacceptable and to be condemned, it is
a far cry from the attitude and conduct expected of an athlete
seeking the mitigation of his sanction for a doping violation under
78
applicable FINA Rules.

Ultimately, The CAS Panel sanctioned Vencill with a full two-year
suspension under the newly adopted FINA Rules.79 After being
banned from swimming for two years, Vencill brought suit against
Ultimate Nutrition, the Connecticut-based supplement manufacturer

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Vencill CAS Decision, CAS 2004/A/484, at 22-25.
Id. at 23.
The Code, supra note 2, art. 2.1.1, at 8.
Vencill CAS Decision, CAS 2004/A/484, at 25.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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that produces Super Complete. Armed with his evidence from the
private testing of his supplements, he sued Ultimate Nutrition in
Orange County Superior Court in California. In May of 2005, a
unanimous jury awarded Vencill $578,635, finding that his Ultimate
80
Nutrition multivitamin was contaminated with a steroid precursor.
Vencill found this holding an inadequate substitute for his chance to
swim, however. In an interview for USA Swimming’s website on May
17, 2005, Vencill said “all the money in the world can’t rewind the
clock.”81
Based on Ultimate Nutrition’s own private testing on capsules
from the same as those purportedly taken by Vencill, and capsules
from surrounding lots, which were all negative for steroid precursors,
the company requested that the California Superior Court vacate the
82
decision against them. In July 2005, the California Superior Court
granted Ultimate Nutrition’s request to vacate the decision.83
84
Following this decision, the parties settled.
IV. INADEQUACIES OF TESTING
A. Unregulated Nutritional Supplements
As evidenced by the Vencill case, the possibility that unregulated
nutritional supplements may be contaminated with banned
substances poses a pressing problem in the fight against doping. The
85
Code holds the athlete liable in such an event. A discussion of the
efficacy and fairness of this rule will follow in Part VI.
In an IOC-funded study led by Professor Dr. Wilhelm Schänzer
at German Sport University in Cologne (as referenced in Vencill),
Professor Schänzer found that many supplements whose labels
indicated that they contained no banned substances (or failed to
86
indicate that they did) tested positive for prohormones. The study,
80. Vencill Was Suspended Two Years, Missed Olympics, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 13,
2005, available at http://www.sports.espn.go.com/oly/news/story?id=2059714.
81. Kicker Vencill, supra note 62.
82. Press Release, Health Strategy Consulting L.L.C., Court Vacates Judgment against
Ultimate Nutrition in the Matter of Kicker Vencill v. Ultimate Nutrition (July 19, 2005),
available at http://www.health-strategy.com/contentmgr/showdetails.php/id/2350.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. The Code, supra note 2, art. 2.1.1, at 3.
86. Dr. Wilhelm Schänzer, Analysis of Non-Hormonal Nutritional Supplements for
Anabolic-Anrogenic Steroids—An International Study, 2001, at 85, available at
http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_324.pdf.
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conducted from October 2000 to November 2001, analyzed 634 nonhormonal nutritional supplements from thirteen countries and 215
different suppliers, obtained through different methods (stores,
Internet, phone, and two samples from the IOC).87 Additionally, 289
of 634 supplements were from companies that also sell prohormones,
while 345 of the supplements were from companies that do not offer
prohormones at all.88 Ninety-four of these supplements (14.8%) were
found to contain prohormones—of either testosterone, nandrolone,
89
These supplements were bought in the Netherlands,
or both.
Austria, the United Kingdom, and the United States and were
attributable to companies located in the United States, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany.90 The level of
anabolic androgenic steroid concentrations found in the ninety-four
91
positive supplements ranged from 0.01 ng/g up to 190 ng/g. Probably
the most alarming finding of the study was “[e]xcretion studies with
application of supplements containing nandrolone prohormones
corresponding to a total uptake of more than 1 ng resulted in urinary
concentrations of the nandrolone metabolite norandrosterone above
the cut-off limit of the IOC for several hours (positive doping result).”92
Only one study, in which ninety-four supplements tested positive
for androgenic steroid concentrations, demonstrate conclusively that
there are multiple supplements on the market, manufactured and sold
in different countries that contain banned substances. Furthermore,
the IOC itself endorsed and funded the Schänzer study, giving its
results more prominence and credibility.93 The Schänzer study
indicates that positive results for nandrolone and testosterone may
indeed be caused by contaminated supplements.
The study also demonstrated that 9.6% of the supplements tested
came from companies that do not sell any prohormone products.94
For these supplements to test positive, either the company is
manufacturing these products at a factory that manufactures other

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Dr. Wilhelm Schänzer, Analysis of Non-Hormonal Nutritional Supplements for
Anabolic-Anrogenic Steroids—An International Study, 2001, at 85, available at
http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_324.pdf (emphasis added).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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companies’ products, which do contain prohormones, or the company
is adding prohormones to its own products and not indicating this on
their labels. Either of these alternatives increases the difficulty for
athletes of determining which supplements are safer to use than
others.
While legislation to provide for the comprehensive regulation of
all dietary supplements would be an ideal solution, it is unlikely that
there could be an across-the-board regulation imposed. Variations in
regulations exist from country to country and from substance to
substance, and this is unlikely to change any time soon. Yet, WADA
must address the realities of the supplement world, whether or not
adequate legislation is enacted. Such remedies will be discussed
below in Parts V and VI.
B. Testing Technology
The vast improvements that have been made in the technology of
testing still lag behind the technology, expertise, and skill of the
cheaters themselves. For example, just prior to the 2004 Athens
Olympics, the exposure of the Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative
(BALCO) scandal involving some of America’s top track and field
95
athletes rocked the United States. BALCO supplied some of these
athletes with tetrahydrogestrinome (THG, or colloquially, “the
96
THG was only identified after a
Clear”), a new designer drug.
prominent coach came forward and sent a syringe containing THG to
97
the USADA. The USADA then used the THG from the syringe to
develop a test for detecting the substance.98 On the eve of the Sydney
Olympic Games, the international sporting community faced the
shock of having a new undetectable drug in use by many of the big
names set to compete, without any means of testing for the substance.
The BALCO scandal, while a huge embarrassment for the United
States, was an equally large embarrassment for the international
sporting community. If top athletes, who were regularly tested by
their NADO could circumvent their NADO’s testing technology by
using substances not yet tested for, how could the system maintain
credibility?

95. I Was THG Whistleblower, Admits Gatlin Coach, Athens Olympics 2004—ABC Sport,
Aug. 23, 2004, http://www.abc.net.au/sport/content/200408/s1182730.htm.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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The BALCO scandal illustrates how athletes can cleverly
undermine testing standards and procedures, while anti-doping
agencies struggle to maintain accuracy and credibility in the system.
For example, anabolic steroids were in wide-spread use long before a
99
reliable test for them was developed in 1974. While testing made up
some ground, athletes wanting to cheat began blood doping.100 Yet,
blood doping was not added to the prohibited list until 1986.101
Erythropoetin (more commonly known as EPO) became a popular
drug, especially among cyclists, and was added to the prohibited list in
1990.102 Yet, a reliable testing method for EPO was not implemented
103
Part of this pattern is clearly
until the 2000 Sydney Olympics.
attributable to the lack of coordination in the world of sports of
doping prior to WADA discussed above in Part I. Indeed, the
response to BALCO and THG seems swift and effective compared to
prior discoveries of previously undetectable substances. While a
positive sign for the future, the race between athletes trying to find
new designer drugs and methods, and the anti-doping effort to find
ways to test for those drugs and methods, seems far from over.
Besides the problem of testing falling behind the cheaters, there
are also questions in regard to the accuracy of the current testing.
Most of the prohibited substances on the WADA List are of an
exogenous nature, meaning that they are “not ordinarily capable of
104
Therefore, when a
being produced by the body naturally.”
laboratory test reveals the presence of such a substance in the
athlete’s specimen, it is reasonable to assume that the substance was
introduced into the athlete’s body by some outside source. However,
the WADA List also contains certain prohibited substances, which
can be produced endogenously (by the human body naturally).105
These substances are subject not to mere detection, but to detection
in excess of a pre-determined level or ratio.106 This level is deemed to
be where the concentration of the substance in the specimen “so

99. History of Anti-Doping, supra note 29.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. WADA Int’l Standard, The 2006 Prohibited List, at 4, available at http://www.wadaama.org/rtecontent/document/2006_LIST.pdf [hereinafter 2006 Prohibited List].
105. Id.
106. The Code, supra note 2, art. 2.1.3, at 9.
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deviates from the range of values normally found in humans that it is
107
unlikely to be consistent with normal endogenous production.”
Such levels or ratios continue to be a hotly contested issue. The
108
most notable case to confront this issue was that of Mary Slaney.
Mary Slaney tested positive for testosterone at the U.S. Olympic
Track and Field Trials in 1996.109 A positive test for testosterone at
the time required a ratio of testosterone to epitestosterone (T/E
110
ratio) greater than six-to-one. Slaney argued that such a ratio was
not reliable, especially with regard to women.111 She claimed that her
heightened T/E ratio was due to the combination of her menstrual
112
USA T&F ruled for Slaney,
cycle and changing birth control pills.
finding that “the IAAF’s rules regarding the use of the T/E ratio test
were vague and inconsistent and the six to one ratio was not
scientifically proven to be inconsistent with the normal ratio in
humans.”113 However, the IAAF found that their rules were clear,
114
and that Slaney had committed a doping offense. Regardless of the
validity of Slaney’s claims, her case brings to light the problems
associated with these ratios and levels provided for in the Code. On
the one hand, WADA must somehow define the illegal level; yet, on
the other hand scientists have conducted studies to show that humans
(especially elite athletes) can naturally produce levels higher than
those provided for under the Code.115 If true, the imperfect science
behind these ratios are putting athletes at risk for false positive
testing results.
The Code does provide some additional protections to guard
against this risk. For example, if the athlete can prove that the
concentration in their specimen is due to a “physiological or
pathological condition,” the sample will not be deemed to contain a

107. 2006 Prohibited List, supra note 104, at 3.
108. Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 580 (7th Cir. 2001).
109. Id. at 586.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Slaney, 244 F.3d at 587.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., B. Le Bizec et al., Evidence for the Presence of Endogenous 19Norandrosterone in Human Urine, 723 J. CHROMATOGRAPHY BIOMEDICAL SCI. APPLICATIONS
157, 169-71 (1999) (finding that intense efforts in soccer competition have been observed to
increase endogenous levels of 19-norandrosterone by a factor of three and suggesting that even
more intense exertions could increase the levels by even higher factors).
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prohibited substance.116 Additionally, the testing itself can sometimes
determine whether the substance in the specimen, although capable
117
of endogenous production, actually is of exogenous origin. In this
118
case, a valid positive test will be declared.
In other, more
questionable situations, there might be further investigation such as
119
an examination of the athlete’s past tests and/or subsequent testing.
Despite these protections, the scientific jury is still out on these levels,
and it appears that there is enough debate to assume that this is
another area where athletes are at risk for false positive test results.
C. Towards the Future: Gene Doping
The challenges facing the international community are only
going to get tougher as time and technology advance. WADA
recently held its second-ever Gene Doping Symposium in Stockholm,
Sweden, on December 4-5, 2005.120 Participants, hailing from fifteen
different countries, included geneticists and other biomedical
121
scientists, ethicists, public policy experts, and IOC representatives.
The conference focused on research, education, and progress.122
Conference participants opined that, although it is not believed that
gene doping is currently being used by athletes, there is a distinct
likelihood that it will be in the future.123 Gene doping124—or gene
transfer—”represents a proven, although very immature and still
125
experimental field of human medicine.” The conference also found
that the process of gene doping is a dangerous one, and there should
be education at every level of athletics to guard against these
dangers.126

116. 2006 Prohibited List, supra note 104, at 3.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 3-4.
120. WADA, Gene Doping Symposium Reaches Conclusions and Recommendations, Dec.
5, 2005, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/newsarticle.ch2?articleId=3115229 [hereinafter Gene
Doping Symposium].
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Defined as “[t]he non-theraputic use of cells, genes, genetic elements, or of the
modulation of gene expression, having the capacity to enhance athletic performance.” 2006
Prohibited List, supra note 104, at 7.
125. Gene Doping Symposium, supra note 120.
126. Id.
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WADA is clearly taking an aggressive approach to future doping
issues, which is a positive sign for the future of sport. There has also
been substantial research into detection methods for gene transfer,
and gene doping is already listed as a prohibited method on WADA’s
127
2006 Prohibited List.
128
WADA has also added a Monitoring Program. In addition to
testing for the menu of substances for in-competition and out-ofcompetition, WADA’s Monitoring Program includes a shorter list of
substances, which are also tested for.129 The purpose of the
monitoring program is to enable WADA “to detect patterns of
130
misuse in sport.” The Monitoring Program is proof that WADA is
keeping a close eye on the pattern of drugs in sports in order to make
adjustments to the Prohibited List.
V. RULE 2.1’S STRICT LIABILITY STANDARD
In Vencill, the CAS panel used Rule 2.1.1 to reject Vencill’s plea
for a reduced sanction under 10.5.2’s “No Significant Fault or
131
Negligence Standard.” Rule 2.1 contains the strict liability standard
that is applied to positive tests—the mere “presence of a Prohibited
Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in an Athlete’s bodily
Specimen”132 is sufficient to establish a doping violation, and intent,
fault, negligence, or knowing use need not be demonstrated.133 In a
comment to Rule 2.1.1, the Code explains the rationale behind this
134
strict liability standard by quoting a 1994 CAS case, Quigley v. UIT.
The Quigley case involved a skeet shooter who was competing in a
World Cup event in Cairo, Egypt. He was ill during the competition
and consulted with a local doctor.135 The doctor, despite knowing
English and looking over the list of banned substances shown to him
by Quigley, provided him with a cough syrup that contained
ephedrine, a banned substance.136 Following an in-competition test,

127. 2006 Prohibited List, supra note 104, at 7.
128. The Code, supra note 2, art. 4.5, at 18-19.
129. WADA, International Standard, The 2006 Monitoring Program, available at
http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/Monitoring_Program_2006_Eng.pdf.
130. The Code, supra note 2, art. 4.5, at 14-15.
131. Vencill CAS Decision, supra note 65, at 23.
132. The Code, supra note 2, art. 2.1, at 8.
133. Id. art. 2.1.1, at 8.
134. Quigley v. UIT, CAS 94/129, 193 (Ct. Arb. Sport 1994).
135. Id. at 187-88.
136. Id. at 188.
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Quigley tested positive for ephedrine and was banned by UIT.137
However, CAS reversed the sanctions because, although they upheld
the strict liability standard, they found that UIT’s rules were not clear
enough to be enforceable.138 The “well-stated” rationale for strict
liability in the Quigley decision said that
It is true that a strict liability test is likely in some sense to be unfair
in an individual case, such as that of Q., where the Athlete may
have taken medication as the result of mislabeling or faulty advice
for which he or she is not responsible—particularly in the
circumstances of sudden illness in a foreign country. But it is also
in some sense “unfair” for an Athlete to get food poisoning on the
eve of an important competition. Yet in neither case will the rules
of the competition be altered to undo the unfairness. Just as the
competition will not be postponed to await the Athlete’s recovery,
so the prohibition of banned substances will not be lifted in
recognition of its accidental absorption. The vicissitudes of
competition, like those of life generally, may create many types of
unfairness, whether by accident or the negligence of unaccountable
Persons, which the law cannot repair. Furthermore, it appears to
be a laudable policy objective not to repair an accidental unfairness
to an individual by creating an intentional unfairness to whole body
of other competitors. This is what would happen if banned
performance-enhancing substances were tolerated when absorbed
inadvertently. Moreover, it is likely that even intentional abuse
would in many cases escape sanction for lack of proof of guilty
intent. And it is certain that a requirement of intent would invite
costly litigation that may well cripple federations—particularly
139
those run on modest budgets—in their fight against doping.

The following discussion will demonstrate why this rationale is
inadequate to support the Code’s strict liability standard.
A. Quigley Rationale: A Poor Analogy
The analogy of an athlete getting sick on the eve of a competition
to an athlete suspended due to inadvertent ingestion of a banned
substance is simply not credible. An athlete who is sick and forced to
miss a competition (even a major one) will certainly suffer the loss of
being able to compete; maybe even the loss of an entire season’s
worth of work. This is unfortunate, but does not hold a candle to the
effects of being banned for two years from one’s sport through no
fault of one’s own. Not only do athletes who accidentally ingest a
137. Id. at 188-89.
138. Id. at 197-98.
139. The Code, supra note 2, art. 2.1.1 Comment, at 8-9 (quoting Quigley v. UIT CAS
94/129, 193 (Ct. Arb. Sport 1994)).
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banned substance suffer the loss of a longer period of lost
competition, they suffer the much greater harms to their reputation,
loss of contracts or endorsements, and a mark on their record that
will remain with them for the rest of their careers and possibly even
beyond. To say that it is a laudable policy to suspend some innocent
athletes so that no guilty athlete ever competes is to belittle the years
of preparation, dedication, and commitment to their sport that these
140
athletes have contributed.
Such a standard easily takes an individual who is in every other
respect a role model and turns them into the disgrace of the sporting
world. This concept, contrary to what many countries consider to be
141
fundamentally fair, is offensive to the very spirit of sport that
WADA and the Olympic Movement seek to develop and protect. It
might, in the short-term, protect the whole body of other competitors;
however, in the long-term, it puts that body of competitors at risk for
the same thing happening to them. As Michael Straubel noted, “[i]f
the system wrongfully punishes or harshly treats athletes it will lose
the support of those it governs.”142
Quigley is also a bad example for WADA to rely on because of
its sympathetic facts. This is exactly the kind of situation in which the
application of a strict liability rule seems particularly disproportionate
to the offense (if you can even call this an offense). Additionally, the
life-is-unfair tone of the Quigley rationale is misguided because, while
life is indeed sometimes unfair, in the case of doping, it is WADA
itself that is creating this particular unfairness to the athletes. If
anything, WADA should have a duty to minimize the unfairness that
athletes are exposed to rather then to add to it.

140. “An athlete accused of taking a performance-enhancing drug has been accused of an
immoral act, and in some cases, a crime. Such an accusation can harm the athlete in a way that
being fired from a job cannot.” Staubel, supra note 7, at 546. See, e.g., Kicker Vencill, supra
note 62 (“I care about what people think about me when it comes to questioning my values and
my integrity . . . for someone who came from a small town in the middle of nowhere in
Kentucky where swimming doesn’t mean anything, and worked my way to a national and
international level, only to be called a cheater when I knew it came from hard work, sacrifice
and dedication[.]”).
141. See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Antonio Rigozzi & Giorgio Malinverni, Legal
Opinion on the Conformity of Certain Provisions of the Draft World Anti-Doping Code with
Commonly Accepted Principles of International Law, Feb. 26, 2003, at 30, available at
http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/kaufmann-kohler-full.pdf [hereinafter Legal
Opinion] (“[C]ritics argue that strict liability doping offences aim to catch the majority of the
‘guilty’ parties while sacrificing a few ‘innocent’ ones: a concept incompatible with the basic
tenets of civilized societies.”).
142. Straubel, supra note 8, at 569.
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In a commendable effort to improve the legitimacy of its
organization, WADA had a legal opinion (hereinafter Legal
Opinion) rendered in 2003 on specific provisions of its Code and their
conformity with “commonly accepted principles of international
143
The opinion, authored by three legal experts, analyzed
law.”
several Code provisions, compared them to standards of international
law (in particular notions of human rights) and either approved the
144
provisions, or suggested changes.
Of note for this discussion, the
opinion found that “[s]trict liability doping offences are, in and of
themselves, consistent with internationally recognized human rights
and general principles of law.”145 However, the opinion makes clear
that the reason that WADA’s Rule 2.1 does not violate such
principles is because the strict liability standard only applies to the
finding of a doping violation (due to the bifurcated nature of the
Code), and because “the only automatic consequence of the strict
liability offence rule is that the athlete is disqualified from the
competition which produced the positive test.”146 In other words, the
hook that keeps the Code’s strict liability rule from violating human
rights and general principles of international law is the inclusion of
sections 10.5.1 and 10.5.2 (discussed below). Yet, the original version
of the Code did not even include Article 10.5 at all, and it was only
added at the recommendation of this Legal Opinion.147 So, while the
Legal Opinion declares that the wording of 10.5 complies with the
148
principle of nulla poena sine culpa (no punishment without fault),
the question remains whether the effect of 10.5 (in particular 10.5.1
and 10.5.2) complies with this standard.
B. Rules 10.5.1 and 10.5.2: Real Possibilities or Mere Tautology?
One of the most hopeful changes in the shift from pre-WADA to
WADA standards was the inclusion of the principles embodied in
Rule 10.5.1 and Rule 10.5.2 of the Code. These are the provisions
that were included to balance out the strict liability standard of Rule
2.1 by providing an opportunity for an athlete with “exceptional

143. Legal Opinion, supra note 141, at 5.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 31.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 39 (“[W]e recommended adding a provision specifying that an athlete could not
be suspended, unless at fault. Following this recommendation, Article 10.5 was added to the
Code.”).
148. Id. at 40.
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circumstances” to have their sanction reduced or eliminated.149 In
theory, this is possible to do under these two provisions. The Code
provides examples of what would and would not satisfy the standards
of these provisions. For instance, the comment to 10.5.2 says that
sabotage by a competitor, despite all due care, would be sufficient for
meeting the “no fault or negligence” standard, but the following
situations would not be sufficient: a mislabeled or contaminated
vitamin or nutritional supplement; the administration of a prohibited
substance by a personal physician or trainer even if the athlete did not
know; or sabotage of food or drink by a spouse, coach, or other
closely related individual.150 The comment adds that any of these
situations might be able to meet the “No Significant Fault or
Negligence” standard and gives the particular example of an athlete
who “clearly establishes that the cause of the positive test was
contamination in a common multiple vitamin purchased from a
source with no connection to Prohibited Substances and the Athlete
exercised care in not taking other nutritional supplements.”151
While it is comforting to know that these provisions have been
included in the code, it is not clear yet whether they are actually
viable, working Code provisions. There is the potential that Rule
2.1.1 will always be used to say, in a sense, “you should have done
more.” For example, in Vencill, the CAS panel accepted his evidence
that he had no knowledge that the multivitamin he was taking was
contaminated, and that the taking of this contaminated multivitamin
152
This sounds quite similar to
is what caused his positive test result.
the explanatory comment discussed above. However, the panel also
found that Vencill did not exercise enough care in the taking of his
supplements to get a reduction under 10.5.2.153 The panel went so far
as to blast Vencill for his “significant” fault, “total disregard of his

149. The Code, supra note 2, art. 2.1.1 Comment, at 8-9. The 2.1.1 Comment reads in part:
“[t]he strict liability rule for the finding of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Specimen,
with a possibility that sanctions may be modified based on specified criteria, provides a
reasonable balance between effective anti-doping enforcement for the benefit of all “clean”
Athletes and fairness in the exceptional circumstances where a Prohibited Substance entered an
Athlete’s system through no fault or negligence on the Athlete’s part.” The Code, supra note 2,
art. 10.5.2 Comment, at 30-32 (“Article 10.5 is meant to have an impact only in cases where the
circumstances are truly exceptional and not in the vast majority of cases.”).
150. Id. art. 10.5.2 Comment, at 30-32.
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. Vencill CAS Decision, supra note 65, at 23.
153. Id. at 25.
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positive duty” under 2.1, and “willful blindness.”154 The panel viewed
Vencill as not only falling short of the standard in 10.5.2, but falling
far short of it. Yet, the decision does not indicate how much care
would have been enough in Vencill’s case to have satisfied 10.5.2.
The apparent near impossibility of meeting the 10.5.2 standard, not to
mention the 10.5.1 standard, effectively reduces these provisions to
empty words. It is hard to imagine how anyone would prove that,
despite due care, they were sabotaged by another competitor.
The Vencill situation presents evidence of the insurmountable
burden on the athlete. Vencill was reprimanded for not testing his
supplements prior to using them. Indeed, it seems that the general
position of WADA, endorsed by CAS, is that in order to live up to
the 2.1.1 standard, an athlete must test every bottle of every
supplement that he or she uses, must guard these bottles against any
kind of sabotage from a competitor or a close relation, and might
even want to get their food and drink tested as well, just to be sure.
In today’s world, where it is not only common for athletes but nonathletes as well to take nutritional supplements for basic health, this
standard is not realistic. Even in the face of warnings given to
athletes, it is unreasonable to expect that anyone, even elite athletes,
could control the chemical make-up of every substance that enters
their body. The WADA rules seem to operate in a world, which
naively hopes that such a burden can easily be complied with by
responsible and careful attention to supplement use. However,
athletes subject to its rules live and act in the real world, where
normal mistakes, inaccuracies, and variability make such a hope
infeasible.
There seems to be no limit to how far 2.1.1 can be used to reject
any defense the athlete puts forward. In essence, if Rule 2.1.1 rejects
almost any excuse under 10.5.1 and 10.5.2, then these provisions have
no effect at all. Thus, it can be argued that these provisions are
included in the Code as empty language solely to satisfy the
requirements of the Legal Opinion.
C. Back to Quigley: Fear of the Floodgates155
With respect to inadvertent ingestion of a banned substance,
World Anti-Doping Agency Chairman Dick Pound said “there could
be no leniency in such cases without destroying the system’s
154. Id.
155. Legal Opinion, supra note 141, at 29-30.
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credibility.”156 This is the unsubstantiated fear of the international
sporting community of what would happen in the absence of a strict
liability standard. An additional fear, which the Quigley opinion
forecasted, is that “a requirement of intent would invite costly
157
litigation that may well cripple federations.” The real threat to the
system’s credibility and to the pocketbooks of the federations,
however, is that athletes do not believe that the system is working,
and that drug scandals are pushing fans and future athletes away from
athletics.
WADA’s use of the Quigley quote as its rationale for strict
liability is an example of the feared alternative to strict liability—the
collapse of the whole system and guilty athletes getting away with
doping. Yet, there are other possible alternatives to strict liability
that maintain a heavy burden on the athlete but provide them with a
real chance to prove their innocence. Such a possibility is discussed
below in Part VI. Furthermore, no one is necessarily advocating a
system in which the burden is on the federation to prove, even after a
positive test, that an athlete intended to dope or cheat. This would be
just as unreasonable as the current system and would lead to the
results feared by WADA.
The strict liability standard can also be said to overshoot even
the tough barrier it is meant to erect. For example, the unlikelihood
of success (because of the strict liability standard) combined with the
costs of litigation borne by the athlete, has lead at least one athlete
158
who claimed innocence not to pursue a legal challenge. Certainly,
while the system is not meant to let an accused athlete out of a
sanction by fanciful legal arguments, it is also not meant to have the
effect of deterring an innocent athlete from even making such
arguments.

156. Amy Shipley, Caught Cheating, or Was She Cheated? Area swimmer has few options
after positive test, WASH. POST, at D1 (Nov. 8, 2004), available at http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32870-2004Nov7.html.
157. The Code, supra note 2, art. 2.1.1 Comment, at 8-9.
158. Rachel Burke, a 21-year-old swimmer at the University of Virginia, tested positive in
June of 2004 for a small amount of a steroid called Boldione. While she initially vowed to fight
to result, “the more she learned about the process . . . the more resigned she became. The
USADA has never lost a case. The [CAS], which hears appeals of USADA decisions, applies
the same rules as the USADA. And the costs of paying the legal, technical, and medical experts
necessary to prove her claims seemed both daunting and, ultimately, useless.” Burke was
quoted as saying that “[i]t was adding up to quite a pretty penny . . . for me to be able to tell
them I didn’t do this, and then they would look me in the eye and say ‘I’m sorry, you know the
rules.’” Shipley, supra note 156.
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D. Towards the Future: Non-Analytical Positives
The BALCO scandal, discussed above, not only changed the
world of drug testing because of THG, but it also supplied the first
159
“non-analytical positives.” Traditionally, a positive drug test results
from an “analytical positive” under WADA Rule 2.1. That is, “[t]he
presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in
an athlete’s bodily specimen.”160 If an athlete takes an in-competition
or out-of-competition drug test, and the lab reports a positive finding,
this is an example of an analytical positive. Conversely, a “nonanalytical positive” is a doping violation which is the result of
anything other than a positive laboratory test, such as admitting to the
use of a prohibited substance or trafficking in a prohibited
substance.161
162
In these cases, the anti-doping organization has the burden to
163
The organization must
prove there has been a doping violation.
prove this “to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing body
164
bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation which is made.” In
meeting this burden, the organization may use “any reliable means,
including admissions.”165 Thus, circumstantial evidence can be used to
find a doping violation, although “[t]here is little guidance regarding
what type of evidence may be used or how much is enough to convict
an athlete of a doping offense.”166
The type of non-analytical positives resulting from the BALCO
situation expanded upon the prior understanding of non-analytical
positives.167 The USADA actually used circumstantial evidence to
show that a doping violation had occurred due to use or attempted use

159. See Cameron A. Myler, How Much Is Enough? Using Circumstantial Evidence to
Prosecute Olympic-Sport Athletes for Anti-Doping Rule Violations, 16 N.Y. ST. B.A. ENT. ARTS
& SPORTS L.J. 8, 10 (2005), available at http://www.nysba.org/template.cfm?Section=Home&
Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=65691.
160. The Code, supra note 2, art. 2.1, at 8.
161. Id. arts. 2.3-2, at 8 (providing for non-analytical positives); see also, Myler, supra note
156, at 9.
162. Unlike analytical positives, where the athlete bears the burden of adducing evidence to
rebut the presumption of doping, for non-analytical positives, “the burden never shifts to the
athlete and the anti-doping organization must prove each element of its case.” Myler, supra
note 159, at 9.
163. The Code, supra note 2, art. 3.1, at 12.
164. Id.
165. Id. art. 3.2, at 12.
166. Myler, supra note 159, at 9.
167. Id.
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of a prohibited substance or method.168
These cases were
revolutionary because of both the expansion of the role of antidoping agencies into investigative areas and also for using all
evidence available to determine use of a prohibited substance in the
absence of a traditional positive test. The significance of the BALCO
cases is in their potential precedent. In these cases, all facts and
circumstances were considered even in the absence of a positive test.
These cases recognized the fact that a positive test does not always
tell the whole story. If this is the trend in doping, it should lead to
more facts and circumstances considered even when there is a
traditional analytical positive test.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT
A. Giving Effect to the Word of the Code
As discussed previously, the strict liability standard currently
employed by WADA affords an innocent athlete virtually no
opportunity to be fully exonerated. Yet, on the flip side, giving the
federations the burden to prove an athlete’s guilt is equally
169
Therefore, this Note proposes a system where a
unappealing.
positive test raises a rebuttable presumption of a doping violation.170
No sanction shall be imposed or even recommended until a hearing
has taken place in front of AAA (or the comparable NADO
sanctioned adjudicatory body in other countries171).
At this
arbitration hearing, the athlete will be able to offer any evidence and
arguments he or she may have on his or her behalf, to both the
validity of the test itself and to any extraordinary circumstances,
168. See USADA v. Gaines, CAS 2004/O/649, 25 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2004); USADA v.
Montgomery, CAS 2004/O/645, 24 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2004) (both cases charged and sanctioned the
athlete for the use of various performance-enhancing drugs although neither had ever tested
positive for in an actual drug test); see also, French v. ASC and Cycling Australia, CAS
2004/A/651, 3-4 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2004) (non-analytical positive was determined because of a
bucket of used syringes and banned substance found a hotel room which French had previously
occupied).
169. “[I]t would be both very difficult and very costly for a sports federation to prove the
fault of an athlete. An athlete is undoubtedly in a better position than a sports federation to
explain why a specific substance was detected in his or her body. In this regard, it should be
emphasized that sports federations are private bodies that lack the powers of coercion necessary
to undertake the type of investigation required to discharge such a burden.” Legal Opinion,
supra note 141, at 41.
170. “[I]t is clear that the presumption of fault . . . is not only appropriate but also essential
in order to pursue an efficient anti-doping policy.” Id.
171. The Code, supra note 2, art. 13.2.2, at 38.
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which could lead to mitigation of the sanction. Only after such
evidence is presented would there be any determination of whether
there was a doping violation. Furthermore, this determination would
be made taking into account both the validity of the test and any
mitigating circumstances offered by the athlete. A doping violation
would be found if the athlete is at fault in any way for the presence of
the banned substance in their specimen. If the athlete proves no
172
fault, then there will be no doping violation.
After a doping
violation is found or not found, a sanction will be determined, based
on the extent of the athletes fault, ranging from a warning to a twoyear suspension (for first-time offenses) and from two-years-and-oneday, to a lifetime suspension (for a successive offense).173
This might sound similar to the current system under the Code,
and it is. Yet, unlike the current Code, Articles 10.5.1 and 10.5.2
would be used and implemented with the spirit in which they were
added to the Code. Otherwise, there has been no change since the
pre-WADA system. Additionally, if these sections are not given real
174
effect, WADA risks violating human rights guarantees. This system
would offer a true case-by-case analysis, protecting the accused
athlete’s rights, while at the same time keeping the entire burden on
the athlete to prove no fault. The focus would be on determining an
appropriate level of punishment, if any, that is proportionate to the
athlete’s degree of fault. Finally, this system would not alter the
number or basic nature of the hearings, therefore keeping the costs to
the anti-doping organization at their current rate.
B. Additional Recommendations
This Note recommends several improvements for the current
problems with the adequacy of testing.
It breaks its
recommendations into two categories, based on the two different

172. This proposal would alter the present bifurcated nature of the current WADA rules.
The process would still be bifurcated into a determination of a doping violation followed by a
determination of the proper sanction, yet the factors considered in each stage will be altered and
the emphasis would be on the latter phase.
173. If it is a second or subsequent offense, that will be a factor in determining both if there
was a doping violation and what the appropriate sanction should be.
174. Legal Opinion, supra note 141, at 35-39. “There is considerable debate as to whether
human rights apply to doping disputes. This being so, there are arguments in favour of their
application and it may be that in the future, courts will enforce human right guarantees in sport
matters. Hence, the Code should be in conformity with human rights and general principles of
law.” Legal Opinion, supra note 139, at 5.
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forms of false positive—those caused by contaminated supplements
and those caused by mistakes in the laboratory.
The first recommendation is directed specifically at the problem
of unregulated supplements, discussed supra. In the absence of any
change in the regulation patterns of countries, there needs to be a
response from WADA.
As of now, with the evidence of
contamination, the burden placed on the athletes is just too heavy to
be reasonable. Part of easing this burden would be to back away
from the strict liability standard as discussed supra in Part VI. In
addition, WADA should assist athletes in narrowing down the
choices of supplements. One possibility is to institute a program in
which
WADA
would
contract
with
supplement
companies/manufacturers to endorse their products to all athletes in
exchange for the company’s use of certain quality standards. Such
standards might include the testing of each batch of supplements that
they produce or compliance with strict manufacturing standards to
ensure that no banned substances are being produced at the same
plant as their ‘clean’ substances. On top of this, the company would
accept liability for any athlete that can prove they tested positive from
175
the contamination of one of their products. The encouragement of
more programs such as these would provide safer choices for athletes.
The second recommendation is intended to help protect athletes
from the demands on WADA-accredited laboratories. Under current
WADA rules, the only way to prevent a finding of a “doping
violation” under Rule 2.1 is to prove that the test itself was
inaccurate. However, since the laboratory is in full custody of the
specimen from start to finish of the test, it is difficult for an athlete to
ever prove any problems with the test itself. One simple way to place
an extra check of the laboratories would be to send the A and B
samples176 to separate laboratories. This would reduce the possibility
of false positives and prevent a laboratory from covering a false
positive test up by matching the B sample to the A (as both tests are
in its control).

175. At least one Canadian company has already taken such a step. See USANA Press
Release, Jan.15, 2004, available at http://www.usanahealthsciences.com/news/news/15Jan04.pdf
(USANA, a nutritional supplement manufacturer, offers a one million dollar guarantee to elite
Canadian athletes against positive drug tests as a result of any of their products).
176. When an athlete provides a sample to a doping organization, the sample is separated
into an A sample and a B sample (labeled with the same sample number), which are both sealed
and sent to the same laboratory.
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CONCLUSION
The international fight against doping has come a long way since
the days of confusing rules and divergent systems of the pre-1999
anti-doping administration. WADA is a tool that can be effectively
used by the international community to put a large dent into the plans
of a devious athlete. However, great precaution must be taken to
ensure that the desire to rid the sport of cheaters does not carelessly
allow innocent athletes to bear the same label without the same fault.
As this Note has exhibited, many avenues leading to false
positives still exist. It has illustrated there are things that athletes
cannot avoid (despite the highest levels of care). It has further
demonstrated that in such situations athletes are consistently left with
no recourse, as they cannot meet the proof standards required under
WADA. With this knowledge, WADA has a responsibility not only
to protect all athletes from cheaters, but also to protect innocent
athletes from false positives. If WADA does not make adjustments
to its policy in order to do this, it is shirking its responsibility to those
yet-unidentified athletes. The Vencill case provides an example of
such an athlete. Instead of protecting him, the system reprimanded
him for not living up to the unbearable burden of Rule 2.1.1. A
system that fears cheaters so much that it is willing to sacrifice the
Kicker Vencills of the world is a system that is hurting those it was
created to protect.
WADA rules 10.5.1 and 10.5.2 contain the potential for a fair
and effective system. However, so far these provisions have been
reduced to mere words and are seemingly easily quashed by the
burden of Rule 2.1.1. According to the 2003 Legal Opinion procured
by WADA, without the effect of these two provisions, the Code
violates human rights and general principles of International Law.
WADA must, as it is doing in the circumstance of non-analytical
positives, keep moving towards a practice of considering all the facts
and circumstances on a case-by-case basis and give each athlete a fair
and real opportunity to prove their innocence.
Taking a step back from Code provisions and legal opinions, the
main goal of an anti-doping organization is to catch cheaters—those
intending to disrespect their sport by enhancing their performance.
The concept of a ‘cheater’ without a doubt involves intent on the part
of the individual involved. A system to catch cheaters, which
disregards intent, is destined to sweep up many innocent individuals
in its path. If WADA and the international community can live with
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that on their conscience, then doping has truly taken a toll on the
spirit of sport.

